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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court changed the landscape of admitting
hearsay statements into evidence with its decision in Crawford v.
Washington. In Crawford the Court held that the Confrontation
Clause of the Constitution precludes the admission of out of court
“testimonial” statements at trial unless either the witness is available to
testify or there has been a previous opportunity for cross examination.1
In the wake of this landmark decision, lower courts throughout the
nation were left to fill in many holes, including the underlying
question: what is testimonial?2 Many federal courts of appeals,
including the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gilbertson, have
started explaining how they define testimonial, giving guidance to trial
courts.3 Presently, not all federal courts of appeals have weighed in on
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
2
Id.
3
435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir.
2004); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); Horton v. Allen, 370
F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005).
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the issue, but the ones that have seem to be in consensus that a
statement is testimonial when a reasonable person would believe that
the statement could be used at trial.4
This note illustrates how the Seventh Circuit has mistakenly
modified this test by adding that the communication must be initiated
by the government.5 The first part of this note gives an brief
overview of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. The second part of
this note analyzes the Supreme Court’s Crawford decision. The third
part of this note explains how other courts of appeals have analyzed
Crawford and how they define testimonial. The fourth part of this
note explains how the Seventh Circuit properly applies a reasonable
expectation of the declarant test but also improperly asserts that the
communication must be initiated by the government to be testimonial.
The fourth part also explains that this addition strays from the
reasoning behind Crawford.
I. HEARSAY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Hearsay
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”6
These statements are generally inadmissible at trial because they are
considered inherently unreliable.7 This unreliability is inferred
because there has been no opportunity for cross-examination, nor have
the judge and jury had an opportunity to see the witness to weigh the

4

Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 796; Saget, 377 F.3d at 229; Cromer, 389 F.3d at 675;
Horton, 370 F.3d at 83-84; Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302; Hinton, 423 F.3d at 360.
5
Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 795-96.
6
FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
7
FED. R. EVID. 802; Whitney Baugh, Why the Sky Didn’t Fall: Using Judicial
Creativity to Circumvent Crawford v. Washington, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1835, 1845
(2005).
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witness’ credibility.8 These concerns are at the heart of the
Confrontation Clause.9
B. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution
requires that in all criminal prosecutions, “the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”10
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[i]f one were to
read this language literally, it would require, on objection, the
exclusion of any statement make by a declarant not present at trial,”
but the Court has rejected this as “unintended and too extreme.”11
Therefore, the Court has consistently allowed some hearsay exceptions
to apply when the declarant is unavailable.12 However, there is little
doubt that the Confrontation Clause was intended to exclude some
hearsay.13 In fact, the Court has established that the Clause “reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that a primary
interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination.”14
The Confrontation Clause envisions
a personal examination and cross-examination, in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worth yof
belief.15
8

See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
12
Id..
13
Id.; See also Green, 399 U.S. 149 at 156-57.
14
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Douglass v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418
(1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
9
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The Framers included the Confrontation Clause within the
Constitution because one of the main “evils” that worried them when
they wrote the Constitution was the English “civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused.”16 During the 16th and 17th centuries,
England commonly used justices of the peace, magistrates, and other
agents of the Crown to conduct pretrial examinations of suspects and
witnesses that were then used at trial in lieu of live testimony against
the defendant.17
For years the Court’s decisions were largely consistent with
this theory of the Confrontation Clause.18 In Mattox v. United States
the Court allowed a hearsay statement to be admitted at trial, relying
on the fact that the defendant had an adequate opportunity to confront
the witness.19 The Court’s later cases continued to respect the
Confrontation Clause.20 But eventually the Court’s rationale departed
from the original intent of the Clause and allowed lower court’s
decisions to do so as well.21
C. Pre-Crawford Analysis
For over twenty years, the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts
governed the admissibility of hearsay of an unavailable witness at
trial.22 The Roberts Court rationalized that the Confrontation Clause
operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible
hearsay.23 First, the Court said that in adherence with the Framers’
preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment
establishes that the prosecution must either produce the witness for
16

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004).
Id. at 44.
18
Id. at 57.
19
156 U.S. at 250.
20
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57; Mancuis v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16
(1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970).
21
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
22
Id. at 60.
23
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
17
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trial or prove that the witness is unavailable.24 Therefore, the
prosecution is generally required to produce, or demonstrate the
unavailability of, the declarant of the statement it wishes to use against
the defendant, whether or not there has been a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.25 Once the witness is shown to be unavailable,26
the Court rationalized that if the declarant is unavailable, there must be
assurances that the hearsay is reliable.27 The underlying purpose of
the Confrontation Clause is to enhance accuracy in the fact-finding
process, therefore, it only approves of hearsay that is “marked with
such trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the reason
of the general rule.”28 The Court opined that the main concern has
been to “insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been
widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed
before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant.’”29
Furthermore, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to “afford the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement.”30 The Court said this “indicia of reliability” requirement
was applied principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions
rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any
evidence within them comports with the “substance of the
constitutional protection.”31
The Court held in Roberts that when the proponent of an out of
court statement is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is

24

Id.
Id. (citing, inter alia, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)).
26
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
27
Id. at 66.
28
Id. at 65-66 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
29
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
30
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161
(1920)).
31
Roberts, 448 U.S.at 66 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895)).
25
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unavailable.32 Even then, however, the statement must bear adequate
“indicia of reliability” to be admissible at trial.33 The Roberts Court
rationalized that reliability can be inferred, without more, in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,
though the Court never defined what constituted a firmly rooted
hearsay exception.34 Therefore, as long as the statement falls within
such a firmly rooted hearsay exception it could be admitted at trial
whether or not the declarant is available.35 If it does not, further
inquiry is necessary to determine if the hearsay shows particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted at trial.36 The Roberts
Court left to the lower courts the analysis of what it meant to have
these guarantees of trustworthiness.37
Therefore, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford a
prosecutor had three ways to admit hearsay against a defendant, as
long as the statement fit into one of the hearsay exceptions. First, the
prosecutor could make the witness available for cross-examination at
the trial.38 Second, he could make a showing that the witness is
unavailable and show that the hearsay falls into some firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule.39 And third, he could make a showing
that the witness is unavailable for trial and convince the trial judge that
the hearsay has indicia of reliability that averts a Sixth Amendment
issue.40
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
With its decision in Crawford v. Washington in 2004, the
Supreme Court re-wrote the rule of evidence as it pertains to the
admissibility of hearsay from an unavailable declarant. The Court
32

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 56.
38
Id. at 66.
39
Id.
40
Id.
33
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noted that the Roberts Court’s objective was not wrong, just the
rationale.41 For years before the Crawford decision many scholars and
members of the Court suggested that the Court revise its Confrontation
Clause doctrine.42 Two different propositions had been suggested to
the Court.43 First, the Confrontation Clause should only be applied to
testimonial statements, leaving the remainder to regulation by hearsay
law.44 Second, there should be an absolute bar to statements that are
testimonial, unless there had been a prior opportunity for crossexamination.45 The Court reiterated its rejection of the first proposal
in Crawford, and left the Roberts test in place for non-testimonial
hearsay evidence.46 But the Court noted the second proposal was
clearly at issue in Crawford.47
In Crawford the Court opined, that the Roberts test allowed a
jury to hear evidence that was untested by the adversarial process and
that was merely based on a judicial determination of reliability,48
which was never the intent of the Founding Fathers.49 Instead of
basing admissibility of evidence on the constitutionally prescribed
method, the Roberts test did so based on a completely foreign one.50
The Court noted that the Roberts test was based upon reliability of
evidence in a way that was completely amorphous and entirely
subjective.51 This was apparent to the Court by looking at the factor
intensive tests used by the Courts of Appeals.52 The Court did not
41

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2003).
Id. at 60-61.
43
Id. at 61.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992)).
47
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
48
Id. at 62.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 63.
52
Id. (See United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 1989) for
analysis of the seven factor test used by the Seventh Circuit. The elements of the test
consist of: 1) the character of the witness for truthfulness and honesty, and the
availability of evidence on the issue; 2) whether the testimony was given voluntarily,
under oath, subject to cross-examination and a penalty of perjury; 3) the witness’
42
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believe that the Framers wanted to leave the Sixth Amendment’s
protection “to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of reliability.”53 The Court admitted that though
the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, “it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”54 In other words, the
Court noted that the Constitution and the Confrontation Clause do not
require that evidence actually be reliable, “but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.”55 In fact, under the Roberts test, “some of the courts
that admit untested testimonial statements find reliability in the very
factors that make the statements testimonial.”56 However, it was not
just the lack of reliability that bothered the Court, it was the fact that
the Roberts test admitted “core testimonial statements that the
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”57 The Court left the
Roberts test in place when dealing with the admissibility of
nontestimonial hearsay.58
The Court further held that the Framers’ concern at the time of
drafting the Confrontation Clause was to protect against “inquisitorial
practices.”59 Therefore, defendants have a right to confront people

relationship with both the defendant and the government and his motivation to testify
… .; 4) the extent to which the witness’ testimony reflects his personal knowledge;
5) whether the witness ever recanted his testimony; 6) the existence of corroborating
evidence; and 7) the reasons for the witness’ unavailability.).
53
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
Id. at 61.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 65 (citing Nowlin v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 579 S.E.2d 367, 37072 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (the fact that the defendnat’s statements were made while in
custody on pending charges made this statement clearly against penal interest and
thus more reliable).
57
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
58
See United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (2005) (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law — as does Roberts, and as would an approach that
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”)).
59
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
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who “bear testimony” against them.60 The Court said that “the
constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law right
of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a
specific type of out-of-court statement.”61 Thus, the Confrontation
Clause applies to testimonial evidence, requiring unavailability of the
witness combined with a prior opportunity for cross-examination.62
Therefore, the Confrontation Clause requires the exclusion of hearsay
testimony unless either the witness is available for trial or there has
been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.63 Presumably, the
only possible exception is that of a dying declaration. The Court
refused to decide that issue, but stated that “if this exception must be
accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”64
A. Why the Court Found Cross-Examinations So Important
The Crawford decision displays why cross-examination is
vitally important to the survival of our adversarial process.65 The
Confrontation Clause guarantees the right of the accused to confront
hostile witnesses; therefore, it protects the right of crossexamination.66 Defendants have the right to test the credibility of their
accusers and confrontation increases the likelihood that an accusation
by an adverse witness is truthful by requiring the witness to confront
the accused.67 The Court has said that “the absence of proper
confrontation at trials calls into question the ultimate integrity of the
60

Id. (The Court in Crawford quoted the definition of testimony as “[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.” (citing NOAH WEBSTER, 1 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
61
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
62
Id. at 69 (“Non-testimonial” hearsay does not implicate the Confrontation
Clause and admissibility is determined by applying appropriate rules of evidence).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 56 n.6.
65
Id. at 65.
66
Baugh, supra note 7, at 1845.
67
Id. at 1846 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1920); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
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fact-finding process.”68 The Court further said that when “testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicia of reliability sufficient to
satisfy constitutional demands are the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”69 The Court went on to analogize the
disposal of confrontation simply because the evidence is reliable to the
disposal of a jury trial simply because the defendant is obviously
guilty.70
When the Framers inserted the Confrontation Clause into the
Sixth Amendment, they intended it to include a right of crossexamination.71 This was obvious to the Crawford Court by looking at
debate prior to the ratification of the Constitution. Many of the
“declarations of rights adopted around the time of the Revolution”
included a right to confrontation, but the proposed Federal
Constitution did not.72 This caused much of objection, specifically
during the ratifying convention in Massachusetts from Abraham
Holmes who said: “The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; …
whether [the defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and
have the advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet told….”73
From this, the Court noted that the inclusion of a right to confrontation
in the Federal Constitution was specifically intended to guarantee the
right to cross examination.74
B. Definition of Testimonial
In Crawford the Supreme Court refused to define what makes a
statement testimonial, stating that “we leave for another day any effort
to spell out a comprehensive definition of testimonial.”75 All the
Court explicitly stated was that the term testimonial “applies at a
68

Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
69
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
70
Id. at 62.
71
Id.
72
Id. 48.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 48-49.
75
Id. at 68.
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minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”76 Therefore,
trial and appellate courts throughout the country have been left to
provide their own definition of testimonial. But, even though the
Court did not explicitly define testimonial, it did provide the lower
courts with guidance.
The Court provided three “formulations of [the] core class of
testimonial statements.”77 The first, which Crawford himself urged
upon the Court, is that testimonial statements consist of “ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent… such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable
to cross-examine or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”78 The second, which
Justice Scalia took from concurring justices in past decisions, defines
testimonial statements as “extrajudicial statements… in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions.”79 The last, which was suggested in an amici curia
from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, describes
testimonial statements as those that are made under circumstances
which would “lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”80
Since the Court refused to define testimonial it is logical to
look at the schools of thought of the definition of testimonial that the
Court referenced in its decision. Once one accepts what the Court
articulates in Crawford, that testimonial evidence is not limited to incourt or sworn testimony,81 then these two schools of thought are in
complete opposition to each other. The first is a very narrow
definition that has been advanced in the work of Professor Ahkil Reed

76

Id.
Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 51-52).
78
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
79
Id. (quoting White v. Ill., 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 50, 52 n.3.
77
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Amar from Yale University.82 Professor Amar believes that a witness
provides testimonial evidence when he testifies “either by taking the
stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions,
videotapes, and the like.”83 This would barely be more than the
minimum standard that the Court set out in Crawford.84 The second
school of thought, championed by Professor Richard Friedman at the
University of Michigan,85 is much broader and encompasses a
statement that is “made in circumstances in which a reasonable person
would realize that it likely would be used in the investigation or
prosecution of a crime.”86 It is important to note that this theory is not
based upon what the speaker actually believed, but what a reasonable
person would believe, which is very close to the one suggested by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.87 Based on his
proposed definition, Friedman offers five rules of thumb:
A statement made knowingly to the authorities that
describes criminal activity is almost always testimonial.
A statement made by a person claiming to be the victim
of a crime and describing the crime is usually
testimonial, whether made to the authorities or not. If,
in the case of a crime committed over a short period of
time, a statement is made before the crime is
committed, it almost certainly is not testimonial. A
statement made by one participant in a criminal
enterprise to another, intended to further the enterprise,
is not testimonial. And neither is a statement made in
the course of going about one’s ordinary business,
82

Franny A. Forsman, Esq., Rene L. Valladares, Esq., Grappling with what
statements are testimonial under Crawford v. Washington: “The Reasonable
Expectation of the Declarant” Test, (October 2005) NEV. LAW. 26 (2005).
83
Id.
84
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
85
Forsman, supra note 82, at 26.
86
Id.; Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1171, 1240-41 (2002).
87
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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made before the criminal act has occurred or with no
recognition that it relates to criminal activity.88
These two ideas examined by the Court in Crawford give
guideposts to lower courts about the Supreme Court’s intended
definition of testimonial.
III. HOW SISTER CIRCUITS ARE DEFINING TESTIMONIAL
About half of the federal courts of appeals have given trial
courts guidance about their definition of testimonial.89 Some of these
courts have utilized the “core class of testimonial statements” that the
Court put forth and others have analyzed the two schools of thought
referenced in Crawford.90 Whichever methodology they use, the
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue all agree that a
statement is testimonial when a reasonable declarant would anticipate
its use at trial.
A. Core Class of Testimonial Statements
In United States v. Summers, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized that even though the Supreme Court did not
rigidly define the term testimonial, it was not “devoid of guidance.”91
In fact, the Court provided relevant “guideposts” to frame lower
courts’ analyses.92 First, the Court provided a baseline, saying
“[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal
88

United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 673-74 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing
Friedman, supra note 86, at 1042-43).
89
See United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Cromer, 389 F.3d 662; Horton v. Allen, 370
F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005).
90
Id.
91
Summers, 414 F.3d at 1300.
92
Id.
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trial; and to police interrogations.”93 The court further noted that the
“formulations of the core class of testimonial statements” that the
Supreme Court referred to in Crawford constituted the rest of the
guidance needed.94 The Tenth Circuit held that the “common nucleus”
in the Court’s reasoning in Crawford was the reasonable expectations
of the declarant.95 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit said that a test that
emphasizes the reasonable expectations of the declarant is most
closely aligned with the original underpinnings of the Sixth
Amendment.96 Though it declined to define this test, the court
ultimately said that testimony by an arresting officer relating to a
statement by the co-defendant, who did not testify, was testimonial.97
In Horton v. Allen, a First Circuit case, the defendant objected
to the admission of hearsay testimony from a woman who had a
conversation with Horton’s accomplice who was not on trial.98 The
court also looked to the three “formulations of [the] core class of
testimonial statements.”99 In doing so the court said that not only were
the statements made at Horton’s trial not contained in formalized
documents such as affidavits, depositions, or prior testimony but the
statements admitted at trial were not “statements under circumstances
in which an objective person would reasonably believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”100
In United States v Hinton, the Third Circuit also relied on the
“core class of testimonial statements.”101 In doing so it recognized an
appreciation for “the third formulation of testimonial offered by the
Court in Crawford” and it endorsed this same test.102 Even though the
Sixth Circuit did not rely upon these formulations of testimonial as
much, the court in Hinton noted that the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in
93

Id. at 1301 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).
Summers, 414 F.3d at 1301-02 (internal citation omitted).
95
Id. at 1302.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1303.
98
Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2004).
99
Id. at 84 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)).
100
Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d at 84.
101
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 2005).
102
Id.
94
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United States v. Cromer was instructive.103 The court believed that the
reasonable expectation of the declarant test was important because the
“broader definition is necessary to ensure that the adjudication system
does not effectively invite witnesses to testify in informal ways that
avoid confrontation.”104
B. Two Schools of Thought
The Sixth Circuit has done the most in depth evaluation of
these two schools of thought. In United States v. Cromer, the court
admitted into evidence statements by a confidential informant to an
officer.105 The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by not
requiring the production of the confidential informant after admitting
the hearsay statements made by the informant.106 Just as the Tenth
Circuit did in Summers, this court recognized that Crawford provided
guidance on the definition of testimonial.107 Specifically, it looked to
the works of Professor Amar and Professor Friedman that the
Crawford Court relied on when redefining the Confrontation
Clause.108
The Sixth Circuit found that the approach put forth by
Professor Friedman is the most consistent with the stated purpose of
the Confrontation Clause, especially in light of the Court’s emphasis,
in Crawford, that the Clause refers to those that “bear testimony
against the accused.”109 The Sixth Circuit believed that statements
that are made to the authorities when the declarant knows that they
will most likely be used in trial are the exact statements that the
Confrontation Clause was intended to protect against, whether or not
103

Id. 360 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 674-75 (6th Cir.

2004)).
104

Hinton, 423 F.3d at 360 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cromer, 389 F.3d at 674-75
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
105
Cromer, 389 F.3d at 666.
106
Id. at 670.
107
Id. at 673.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 674.
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they are formal statements.110 The court recognized that this “broader
definition” is necessary to make sure that a witness does not
intentionally testify in an informal way to avoid confrontation, which
would eviscerate our adjudicative and adversarial process.111 In fact,
the Sixth Circuit went on to note that there is actually a greater danger
to defendants to allow admission, without confrontation, of an
informal statement volunteered to police as opposed to one elicited by
police.112 The court stated that “one can imagine the temptation that
someone who bears a grudge might have to volunteer to police,
truthfully or not, information of the commission of a crime, especially
when that person is assured he will not be subject to confrontation.”113
The Sixth Circuit referenced an example by Professor Friedman of a
rape victim that is assured by a private rape counselor that she is able
to give a videotaped statement that can be provided to prosecutors and
there is little chance that she will have to testify in court.114 The court
notes that this will only give witnesses incentive to ensure that all
testimony they give is informal.115 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit stated
that the proper inquiry is “whether the declarant intends to bear
testimony against the accused,” and that intent can be inferred by
deciding whether a reasonable person would anticipate that the
statement would be used against the accused.116 It is within this
framework that the Sixth Circuit decided that a confidential
informants’ statement are testimonial.
The Second Circuit Court also looked to these schools of
thought in its analysis of testimonial.117 In United States v. Saget, the
court held that a statement the defendant made to a confidential
informant was not testimonial, when the defendant did not know that
the person was an informant.118 That court discussed the Supreme
110

Id.
Id.
112
Id. at 675.
113
Id. (emphasis added).
114
Id. (emphasis added).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004).
118
Id. at 229-30.
111
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Court’s reference of Professor Friedman’s article in Crawford and
noted that even though Crawford does not explicitly endorse
Friedman’s views, it does suggest that the “determinative factor in
determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant’s
awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used
at a trial.”119
IV. DOES THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY DEFINE TESTIMONIAL?
A. The Seventh Circuit: Post Crawford
For almost two years after Crawford, the Seventh Circuit did
not provide any real guidance to the trial courts about its definition of
testimonial. Instead, the court simply ruled on the facts before it,
saying whether or not the hearsay at issue was testimonial. During
this time the court indicated that Crawford does not apply to
sentencing hearings,120 police alerts,121 or a government file containing
intercepted correspondence incriminating the defendant.122
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit followed the many other circuits that
held statements of co-conspirators are not hearsay and, therefore, are
not testimonial.123 The court also held that it is doubtless a casual
conversation between two people would not be considered
testimonial.124 But the court has held that a confession of a co-

119

Id. at 228.
United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the
relevant provision to sentencing is the Due Process Clause and not the Confrontation
Clause).
121
United States v. Prince, 418 F.3d 771,780-81 n.5 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
that the admission of the police alert was not for the truth of the matter asserted and
therefore not hearsay and even if it was being used to establish truth of the matter
asserted it would not necessarily be testimonial).
122
United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 576 (7th Cir. 2005).
123
United States v. Jenkins, 419 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Reyes 362 F.3d 536, 540 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004).
124
United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
120
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defendant, who was tried separately, was testimonial.125 Though it
could be interpreted that the court was applying the same reasonable
expectation of the declarant test, the court never explicitly held either
way.
That all changed when the Seventh Circuit published its recent
decision in United States v. Gilbertson.126 In Gilbertson, the
defendant asserted that the admission of odometer statements from the
certificates of title violated his Sixth Amendment rights.127 In its
decision, the court did not go into an abundance of detail but noted
that the Supreme Court provided guidance for lower courts about the
definition of testimonial.128 The Seventh Circuit, like the Tenth, First
and Third, turned to the three formulations of the “core class of
testimonial statements.”129
Because Gilbertson himself focused on the second formulation,
the court first focused on that formulation of testimonial.130 The
second formulation that was mentioned by the Court in Crawford was
based on Justice Thomas’ concurrence in White v. Illinois.131 The
Seventh Circuit noted that the “evil” Justice Thomas referred to in his
opinion “was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations against the accused.”132
The court went on to note that “reading Justice Thomas’ formulation
with the first and the third formulations, it is readily apparent from
Crawford that ‘[o]nly statements made following government official
initiated ex parte examinations or interrogation developed in
anticipation of or in aid of criminal litigation are encompassed within
the core meaning of the confrontation clause.’”133
125

See United States v. Jones, 371 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2004).
435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006).
127
Id. at 794.
128
Id. at 795.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992).
132
Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 795 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
50 (2004)).
133
Id. at 795 (quoting MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 7032 (2d ed. Supp. 2005)).
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Therefore, the Seventh Circuit adopted the same reasonable
expectation of the declarant test used by many other circuits.134 But,
the court did not end there. Unlike any other circuit, the court required
that communication be initiated by the government for any statements
to be considered testimonial.135
B. Is the Seventh Circuit Correct?
Yes and no.
The decision of the Seventh Circuit as well as many other
circuits to apply the reasonable expectation of the declarant test is
appropriate in light of the Court’s reasoning in Crawford. Since the
Court chose not to define testimonial; individual courts were left to
make that determination for themselves. As many circuits noted, in
doing so, they are not without guidance from the Supreme Court.136
The first thing that most courts have done is look at what
parameters the Crawford Court did draw. As the Tenth Circuit noted
in Summers, the Court established a “baseline”137 in Crawford,
explicitly saying that at a minimum the term testimonial applies “to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations.”138 Therefore, courts have a
starting point from which to work. Furthermore, the Court did draw
the line on the other side of the spectrum. The Court noted that “[a]n
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.”139 These are not the only guideposts; the
Court also gave three “core formulations” of testimonial as well as to
reference two specific scholars that have debated the definition of
testimonial.140 As the Second Circuit noted, it is the common nucleus
134

Id. at 796.
Id. at 795-96.
136
Id. at 795; United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 673 (6th Cir. 2004).
137
United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1301 (10th Cir. 2005).
138
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
139
Id. at 51.
140
Id. 51-52.
135
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present in the formulations that “centers on the reasonable expectation
of the declarant.”141 The court further noted that it is the reasonable
expectation of the declarant that “distinguishes the flippant remark,
proffered to a casual acquaintance from the true testimonial
statement.”142
But where the Seventh Circuit went wrong was finding that for
a statement to be testimonial the communication must have been
initiated by the government.143 In doing so, the court’s analysis of
testimonial became much more aligned with Professor Amar’s
definition than Professor Friedman’s. But this definition is not inline
with the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause. In Cromer, the
Sixth Circuit quickly dispensed with Professor Amar’s definition of
testimonial.144 It noted that “[t]he Crawford Court found the absence
of an oath not to be determinative in considering whether a statement
is testimonial” and the court noted that the other formalities identified
by Professor Amar were not necessary components of a testimonial
statement.145 The court further declared that the danger to a defendant
might actually be greater if the admitted statement is volunteered to
police rather than elicited through formalized police interrogation,
“[o]ne can imagine the temptation that someone who bears a grudge
might have to volunteer to police, truthfully, or not, information of the
commission of a crime, especially when that person is assured he will
not be subject to confrontation.”146 The Confrontation Clause applies
to witnesses who “bear testimony,”147 therefore; the proper inquiry
revolves around the intent of the declarant and not who initiates the
conversation.148 Basing the definition on who initiates the
conversation would only encourage witnesses to give statements
informally.149 It is also important to note the purpose of the
141

Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302.
Id.
143
Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 795-96.
144
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 674-75 (6th Cir. 2004).
145
Id. at 674.
146
Id. at 675.
147
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
148
See Cromer, 389 F.3d at 675.
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Id.
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Confrontation Clause was not just to curb lying, but it was also
implemented to give the judge and jury an opportunity to see the
witness to weigh the witness’ credibility as well as the witness’
recollection of the events.150 Therefore, even if a person who
volunteers information about a crime is truthful, the defense is
supposed to have the opportunity to cross-examine that witness about
the accuracy of the information. Applying the Seventh Circuit’s test
would strip the defense of this right.
Furthermore, the Court noted that “[t]he most notorious
instances of civil-law examination occurred in the great political trials
of the 16th and 17th centuries.”151 During these trials English courts
refused defendants’ requests that accusers be brought before them.152
The Court used the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh as one of the
best examples of what the Framers wanted to avoid with the
implementation of the Confrontation Clause.153 Lord Cobham,
Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, implicated Raleigh in both an
examination and in a letter that he sent to the court without
provocation.154 Raleigh believed that Lord Cobham would recant and
“demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that the Proof of
the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him
speak it.”155 The court refused and allowed the reading of the
examination and the letter into evidence.156 One of the trial judges
“later lamented that the justice of England has never been so degraded
and inured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.”157 This
case spurred reform that not only required face to face accusations at
150

See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
152
Id. at 43 (citing J. STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
326 (1883); W. HOLDSWORTH, 9 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 216-17, 228 (3d ed.
1944)).
153
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
154
Id.
155
Id. (quoting 2 How. St. Tr., at 15-16 (1603)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
156
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
157
Id. (quoting D. JARDINE, 1 CRIMINAL TRIALS, 520 (1832) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
151
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arraignment, but the Court of King’s Bench said that it mandated the
right to cross-examine.158
In dispensing of the Roberts test, the Court noted that “[t]he
Raleigh trial itself involved the very sorts of reliability determinations
that Roberts authorizes.”159 In that trial, the prosecution used “many
of the arguments a court applying Roberts might invoke today: that
Cobham’s statement were self-incriminating, that they were not made
in the heart of passion, and that they were not extracted from him upon
the hopes or promise of a Pardon.”160 Furthermore, the Court went on
to say that,
It is not plausible that the Framers’ only objection to
the trial was that Raleigh’s judges did not properly
weigh these factors before sentencing him to death.
Rather, the problem was that the judges refused to
allow Raleigh to confront Cobham in court, where he
could cross-examine him and try to expose his
accusation as a lie.161
The main “evil” the Framers’ attempted to protect against with
the inclusion of the Confrontation Clause was these “civil law
examinations,”162 but this protection was not limited to government
initiation communication. In fact, looking at the Raleigh case, that the
Court relied heavily on in its Crawford decision, it is apparent that the
Court did not intend to limit testimonial evidence to formal
investigations or interrogations.163 The Court noted in Crawford that
one of the pieces of evidence used against Raleigh was a letter that
was sent without provocation.164 The Court used the introduction at
158

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45 (citing King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584

(1696)).
159

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
Id. (citation omitted).
161
Id.
162
Id. at 44.
163
Id. at 45.
164
Id.
160

126
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/8

22

Windon: <em>Crawford v. Washington</em> — How the Seventh Circuit Imprope

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 1, Issue 1

Spring 2006

trial of both the pre-trial examination and the letter as examples of
what the Framers tried to avoid with the implementation of the
Confrontation Clause.165 Accordingly, it is apparent that the Court did
not intend to limit the definition of testimonial to statements that were
obtained through government initiated communication.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit misread opinions from its
sister courts. In Gilbertson, after declaring that a testimonial statement
is one in which the communication is initiated by the government; the
court noted that “[o]ther circuits have come to a similar
conclusion.”166 This is simply inaccurate. While it is true that the
other circuits the Seventh Circuit cites all agree about the use of the
reasonable expectation of the declarant test, not one of those circuits
agree that the communication must be initiated by the government.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court handed down its Crawford decision,
courts across the country have attempted to decipher what testimonial
means. Some courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have given
guidance to the trial courts, holding that the applicable test is whether
a reasonable person would believe the statement would be used at
trial.167 Based on the Court’s analysis of the Confrontation Clause and
the guideposts it left for lower courts, this is the appropriate decision.
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit did not end its analysis there. The
Seventh Circuit further opined that for a statement to be testimonial it
must be the product of government initiated communication.168 By
looking to the three formulations of testimonial statements, the two
165

Id. at 44.
See United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Cromer, 389
F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004); United States
v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355
(3d Cir. 2005)).
167
. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 796; Saget, 377 F.3d at 229; Cromer, 389 F.3d at
675; Horton, 370 F.3d at 83-84; Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302; Hinton, 423 F.3d at
360.
168
Gilberston, 435 F.3d at 795-96.
166
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schools of thought concerning testimonial and to trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh that the Court referenced in Crawford, it is apparent that this
formulation is simply the wrong conclusion to draw from Crawford
and the history of the Confrontation Clause.
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